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THE FEDERAL CORPORATE SURPLUS TAX
RANDOLPH E. PAUL*
I
CORRELATION OF DIVIDENDS PAID CREDIT AND TAXABILITY
OF DISTRIBUTIONS1
Nothing could better illustrate the "substantial difference" 1  between
corporation and stockholder than the shifting of the center of gravity in con-
nection with the taxability of corporate distributions accomplished by the
undistributed profits surtax. The question used to be: "Will the distribution
be taxable to stockholdersf" The stockholder has been forced from the
center of the stage. Interest in the tender feelings of stockholders has
noticeably diminished in the face of competing sensibility. The new question
is: "Will the distribution furnish a dividends paid credit to the corporation?"
The general plan of the Federal Corporate Surplus Act is to make one ques-
tion of these two questions, and to give a credit only for a distribution which is
taxable. The result is transfer of concern about the taxable status of stock-
holders to anxiety as to the possibility of a dividends paid credit to the cor-
poration. Since credits for the purpose of this new tax are limited, the
question is of great importance to corporations.
Several statutory provisions govern the computation of the dividends paid
credit under the 1936 corporate undistributed profits surtax. The Act
provides (Sec. 27 (b)):
"If any part of a distribution (including stock dividends and stock
rights) is not a taxable dividend in the hands of such of the shareholders
as are subject to taxation under this title for the period in which the
distribution is made, no dividends paid credit shall be allowed with re-
spect to such part."
It is also provided in the Act (Sec. 27 (e)):
"In case of a stock dividend or stock right which is a taxable dividend
in the hands of shareholders under section 115 (f), the dividends paid
credit with respect thereto shall be the fair market value of the stock or
the stock right at the time of the payment."
One must look beyond the four corners of the dividends paid credit section
of the statute to gather together the relevant statutory provisions in connection
*The writer is indebted to Mr. Robert Eichholz of the New York Bar for valuable
assistance in the preparation of this article.
'No attempt is made in this article to discuss the undistributed profits surtax in its
possible effects on corporate financing. For a review of this subject see Thorpe and
George, An Appraisal of the Undistributed Profits Tax, DUN'S REVIEW (Sept. 1937).
"=Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 214 (1920).
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with the question of the extent to which stock dividends may constitute a
dividends paid credit.2  The cross-reference to Section 115 (f) is to a nevr
provision in the 1936 Act, as follows:
"(1) General Rule.-A distribution made by a corporation to its share-
holders in its stock or in rights to acquire its stock shall not be treated
as a dividend to the extent that it does not constitute income to the share-
holder within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion.
"(2) Election of Shareholders as to Medium of Payment.-Whenever
a distribution by a corporation is, at the election of any of the shareholders
(whether exercised before or after the declaration thereof), payable either
(A) in its stock or in rights to acquire its stock, of a class which if dis-
tributed without election would be exempt from tax under paragraph
(1), or (B) in money or any other property (including its stock or in
rights to acquire its stock, of a class which if distributed without election
would not be exempt from tax under paragraph (1), then the distribution
shall constitute a taxable dividend in the hands of all shareholders, regard-
less of the medium in which paid."
Tests as to the Taxability of Stock Dividends2'
Since the statute gives a dividends paid credit only with respect to taxable
stock dividends, it is first necessary to determine the extent to which such
dividends are taxable. The last few years have witnessed a revival of mental
activity on the subject of stock dividends. The status of taxable dividends
was supposed to have been settled in 1920 by the famous Macomber decisioj.&
This decision was accepted broadly as a complete condemnation of any attempt
to tax stock dividends of all kinds. This acceptance extended to a statutory
enactment of the decision in the 1921 Act.4 The statutory exemption was
continued in subsequent acts, including the 1934 Act.5 For many years no one
did any thinking on the subject of the status of stock dividends, and it was
generally assumed: (1) that all stock dividends were constitutionally exempt
from tax, and (2) that the statutory exemption applied indiscriminately to all
such dividends. 6
'The Treasury interpretation, Reg. 94, Art. 27 (h)-l, is as follows:
"No dividends paid credit shall be allowed with respect to any part of the dis-
tribution by a corporation to its shareholders which is ...
(c) a distribution in stock of the corporation or rights to acquire its stock which
does not constitute income to its shareholders within the meaning of the sixteenth
amendment to the Constitution (see section 115 (f) and articles 115-3 and 115-4)."
'This term is used in the sense of dividends paid in stock of the distributing cor-
poration, not as including corporate distributions in stock other than that of the distribut-
ing corporation.
1252 U. S. 189 (1920); TD 3052, CB-3, p. 38. Old tax practitioners will remember
the original doubts as to how far the Supreme Court meant to go in this decision. The
doubt revolved about the Supreme Court's use of the expression "bona fide," and alsa
specifically touched the question of the status of distributions paid in preferred stock.
'Sec. 201 (d) of this Act provided: "A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax.'"
'1934 Act, § 115(f) ; see also 1932, 1928 Acts, § 115(f) ; 1926, 1924 Acts, § 201(f).
'As pointed out in James H. Torrens, 31 B.T.A. 787 (1934), no question was
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So far as the record shows, thinking processes revived for the first time in
1933 when the government first contended that a dividend .upon cumulative
non-voting preferred stock payable in conmron voting shares was not a tax-
free stock dividend.7 In the meantime the Board in a memorandum opinion
in the well-known Koshland case had held somewhat obliquely that a common
stock dividend paid to preferred shareholders was a taxable distribution.
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision.8 The Supreme
Court reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals, thus agreeing with the position
of the Board in its memorandum opinion.9 Congress, still mystified, was
nevertheless prompt to take advantage of the Koshland decision and immedi-
ately in the 1936 Act passed the above-quoted provision, declaring a legislative
purpose to tax such stock dividends as might be constitutionally taxable.
The only clear part of this equivocal provision was the purpose to do every-
thing Congress could do.
We have, therefore, as a result, a situation in which, with certain exceptions,
we are ignorant as to what Congress meant in the exemption granted broadly
to stock dividends by all revenue acts, beginning with the 1921 and ending with
the 1934 Act, and also as to what stock dividends may be taxed if the exemp-
tion was not all-inclusive. Beginning with the 1936 Act, we know what
Congress meant to do, but we do not know what part of its purpose was ac-
complished. We feel sure that common stock distributions paid to common
stockholders are exempt, and that common stock distributions paid to pre-
ferred stockholders'and preferred stock distributions to common stockholders
are probably taxable. It is important to note that our lack of knowledge affects
not only the treatment to be accorded to stockholders, but also the determina-
tion of the dihidends paid credit of the distributing corporation.' 0
The starting point for any discussion of this subject is Eisner v. Macomber.
It was therein held that a dividend in common stock paid to common stock-
holders was not constitutionally subject to tax."1 The decision stated two
tests for determining taxability of corporate distributions:
(1) whether the stockholders' pre-existing proportionate capital interest
in the corporation has been altered; and
raised as to the exempt status of the stock dividends involved in numerous cases. See
infra note 20.
'Tillotson Mfg. Co., 27 B. T. A. 913 (1933), aff'd 76 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 6th 1935).
881 F. (2d) 641 (C.C.A. 9th 1936).
9298 U. S. 441 (1936). See qualifications in Note 21.
"Corporations will also desire to secure a credit for earnings which by contract can-
not be distributed as cash dividends, but which may be capitalized by distribution of
stock. See Reg. 94, Art. 26-2(b), which excludes such contractual limitations from the
credit provided by Sec. 26(c).
In Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 (1890), it was held that as between cestid and
trustee a stock dividend is capital and not income. It was pointed out that a stock
dividend neither takes from nor adds to corporate wealth, and that it does not in-
volve any segregation or depletion of corporate assets.
THE FEDERAL CORPORATE SURPLUS TAX
(2) whether anything has been severed from that capital interest upon
which a tax could be imposed.
Subsequent cases, involving distributions of stock in another corporation' 2
and corporate reorganizations, 13 established what may be regarded as a third
test applicable in certain instances, namely, whether the stockholders have
received anything substantially different from what they previously had.
This is merely a different way of stating the second test, but subsequent
stock dividend cases have used the terminology of differences in the character
of property, rather than that of severance.'
4
Common Stock Dividends Paid to Preferred Shareholders
At the other extreme from common stock dividends paid to common share-
holders lie common stock dividends paid to preferred shareholders. In
Koshland v. Helvering'5 it was held that such a distribution was income and
not a return of capital, so that upon a subsequent disposition of the preferred
shares, no part of their original cost was to be apportioned 16 to the common
shares. 17 Obviously, the relative equities of common and preferred stock-
holders are altered in such a case. Inasmuch as the profits distributed still
remain subject to the corporation's control and at risk in its business, at least
some incidents of severance are missing, but the distributees have received
something very different from what they had before. In the words of Mr.
Justice Roberts :18
"On the other hand, where a stock dividend gives the stockholder an
interest different from that which his former stock holdings represented
he receives income. The latter type of dividend is taxable as income under
the Sixteenth Amendment."
Furthermore, by his acquisition of common stock, the preferred shareholder
gets a participating capital interest in future profits.' 9 In this respect the
proportion and severance rules overlap.
'
2U. S. v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156 (1921) ; Rockefeller v. U. S., 257 U. S. 176 (1921).
"Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U S. 134 (1923); Weiss v. Steam, 265 U. S. 242 (1924);
Marr v. U. S., 268 U. S. 536 (1925).
"Other verbal variants of the tests set out in the text are (1) whether the share-
holder has a value after capitalization of surplus different from the previously existing
value; (2) whether there was anything more than a book adjustment involving transfer
of profits from surplus account to capital stock liability; (3) whether corporate profits
no longer remain the legal property of the corporation; (4) whether the profits no
longer remain at risk in the corporate business. See Michaels v. McLaughlin, 20 F. (2d)
959 (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1927). However, these tests seem to be largely descriptions of
results rather than explanations of reasons.
1298 U. S. 441 (1936).
"Cf. Reg. 94, Arts. 115-7, 111-1, 113(a) (12)-i; Reg. 86, Arts. 115-8 , 111-1, 113(a)
(12)-i; Regs. 77, 74, Arts. 628, 600; Regs. 69, 65, Arts. 1548, 1599; Reg. 62, Art. 1548.
:"The same conclusion had previously been reached in Com'r. v. Tillotson Mfg. Co.,
76 F. (2d) 189 (C.C.A. 6th 1935).
"At p. 446
"See dissenting opinions in James H. Torrens, 31 B.T.A. 787 (1934), and H. C.
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Other Types of Stock Dividends
Between the opposite poles of the Koshland and Macomber cases lie numer-
ous other types of stock dividends, the taxable status of which has not been
settled. Where there are no preferred shares already outstanding, a dis-
tribution of preferred stock to common stockholders does not alter their
proportional interests and gives them nothing that they did not have before
the distribution. Such dividends have been repeatedly treated as non-
taxable distributions.2 0
There is considerably more doubt concerning such a distribution where
preferred shares are already outstanding. The inconclusive nature of the
decisions is heightened by the fact that prior to the 1936 Act, the exemption
of stock dividends from taxation may have made the problem statutory rather
than constitutional.21 In James H. Torrens22 and H. C. Gowran23 a majority
of the Board, evidently considering that Congress had intended to exempt
from tax only those dividends which fell within the rule of Eisner v. Macom-
ber, ruled on the question on constitutional grounds. It declared that its
previously announced rule,2 that a common stock dividend to preferred stock-
holders was taxable because of the substantially different character of the
shares received on distribution, should be applied to the converse factual situa-
tion of a distribution of preferred stock to common stockholders. There were
vigorous and exhaustive dissents in both cases. On the question of statutory
interpretation the dissenting members said that if the exemption was intended
only to cover the Macomber situation, it was mere surplusage. The minority
did not consider the Tillotson case applicable, because: (1) in that case pre-
ferred stock dividends were in arrears, so that there was, in a sense, a liquida-
tion of a debt rather than a voluntary distribution; and (2) common stock-
holders have a capital interest in the corporate surplus, so that preferred stock
given in payment thereof represents capital, or a mere evidence of a share
in the surplus to the extent of the dividend.
Gowran, 32 B. T. A. 820 (1935), rev'd 87 F. (2d) 125 (C. C. A. 7th 1936), wherein it
is pointed out that preferred stockholders have only an income interest in the corporate
surplus, so that common stock given in payment of that income interest constitutes income.
'Com'r v. Brown, 69 F. (2d) 602 (C.C.A. 7th 1934); Frances Elliott Clark, 28
B. T. A. 1225 (1933); T. Pierre Champion, 27 B. T. A. 1312 (1933); Louis Rorimer,
27 B. T. A. 871 (1933); Robert R. Meyer, 27 B. T. A. 44 (1932); Alfred A. Laun,
26 B. T. A. 764 (1932); IT 2493, CB VIII-2, p. 133. In most of these cases the
point seems to have been more or less assumed. Similarly, a distribution of new non-
voting B common to holders of voting A common has been held non-taxable in Chap-
man v. U. S., 63 Ct. Cls. 106 (1927).
'The opinion in the Koshland case expressly avoids passing upon the question of
statutory construction-whether Congress had imposed tax as distinguished from having
the right to do so.
-31 B.T.A. 787 (1934).
-32 B. T. A. 820 "(1935), rev'd 87 F. (2d) 125 (C.C.A. 7th 1936) ; see also Annie M.
Pfeiffer, Mem. Op. June 7, 1936, rev'd 88 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A 2d 1937).
'Tillotson Mfg. Co., 27 B. T. A 913 (1933), aff'd 76 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 6th 1935).
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Furthermore, the minority argued that the majority opinion was incorrect
in basing its conclusion on the answer to the question whether preferred stock
was outstanding at the time of the distribution 5 for the reason that the
interest of other preferred stockholders was not altered, but remained limited'
to a prescribed dividend in any case.
When the same question reached the Second Circuit in Pfeiffer v. Comm'r,26
that court held the dividend non-taxable without considering the constitu-
tional question. It reasoned that the statutory exemption covered all stock
dividends. In reviewing the Gowran case,27 the Seventh Circuit reached the
same conclusion, but added that, on the authority of Koshland v. Helvering,
the dividend was constitutionally taxable, since it distributed "property rights
of variant character" from those which the stockholders previously owned.
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court has granted certiorari 23 in these two cases,
some progress toward the solution of these questions may be hoped for in
the present term.
281
No cases have yet arisen involving preferred shares distributed to pre-
ferred shareholders.2 9  Elements of severability are not many. It may,
however, be considered that such a distribution is a taxable dividend under the
proportion rule, because future earnings would thereafter be subject to a
greater preference in favor of preferred stockholders30 as between such stock-
holders and common stockholders.31
'This distinction has been preserved by the Board. See August Horrmann, 34 B. T.
A. 1178 (1936).
-88 F. (2d) 3 (C. C.A. 2d 1937).
"Gowran v. Com'r, 87 F. (2d) 125 (C. C. A. 7th 1936).
'57 Sup. Ct. 924, 925 (1937).
'On December 6, 1937, the Supreme Court announced its decisions in the Gowran
and Pfeiffer cases, holding that the stock dividends involved did not constitute taxable
income under laws in force when paid. The opinion places the decision on statutory
construction-Ed.]
The feasibility of using common stock distributions to preferred stockholders to
secure a credit is minimized where the preferred stock calls for a cash dividend. In such
cases the assent of the distributees will be necessary, especially in the case of cumu-
lative preferred stock the dividends on which are in arrears. See Thorpe and George, An
Appraisal of the Undistributed Profits Tax, DuN's REvIEw, p. 9, in (Sept. 1937).
'In L. Elmer Wood, 29 B. T. A. 735 (1934), preferred stockholders were given the
option of receiving cash or additional preferred shares. In holding this to be a cash
dividend, the Board regarded only the optional feature involved.
'But as to this argument, see dissenting opinions in the Gowran and Torrens cases,
in which it is contended that the limited interest of new preferred stockholders in the
corporate surplus does not materially affect the equities of other stockholders.
mOther types of dividends may be mentioned in passing. In Doerschuk v. U. S., 274
Fed. 739 (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1921), debenture bonds distributed to common stockholders
were held to be income. The contention that a debenture bond was like preferred stock
was dismissed without comment. In T. I. Hare Powel, 27 B. T. A. 55 (1932), a distri-
bution of rights to convertible bonds was held non-taxable. Remarking that the deci-
sion in Miles v. Safe Deposit Co., 259 U. S. 247 (1922), rests on the fact that stock rights
are evidence of a preemptive right inherent in stock ownership, and that this pre-
emptive right extends to convertible bonds, the Treasury is in accord; GCM 13275,
CB XIII-2, p. 121.
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Treasury Shares
The proper treatment to be accorded distributions of treasury shares raises
a separate statutory problem. Section 27 (c) of the 1936 Act provides for a
dividends paid credit in respect of dividends in kind "including stock of the
corporation if held by the corporation as an investment". The regulations
state :32
"Unless shown to the contrary, shares of capital stock once issued but
thereafter acquired by the corporation in any manner whatsoever, but
not retired, shall be deemed to be held by the corporation as an invest-
ment."
This provision is certainly of doubtful constitutionality3 3 as applied to treasury
common shares distributed to common stockholders.3 4 Any distinction be-
tween a distribution of authorized and a distribution of treasury shares would
have slim foundation in reality, and would be at most little more than a for-
mula for overruling the decision in Eisner v. Macomber.
The theory of the statute is apparently that treasury shares are an asset35
of the corporation, a distribution of which would fall within the rule of
Peabody v. Eisner.36 A review of the authorities3 7 as to whether treasury
stock is to be carried as an asset or a liability would be both futile and incon-
clusive. As pointed out by Judge Learned Hand,38 it is really neither the
one nor the other. In Judge Hand's own words,
"To carry the shares as a liability, and as an asset at cost, is certainly a
fiction, however admirable. They are not a liability, and on dissolution
could not be so treated, because the obligor and obligee are one. They are
not a present asset, because, as they stand, the defendant cannot collect
upon them. What in fact they are is an opportunity to acquire new assets
for the corporate treasury by creating new obligations. In order to indi-
cate this potentiality, it may be the best accounting to carry them as an
asset at cost, providing, of course, all other assets are so carried."
'Reg. 94, Art. 27(c)-1.
'It is suggested by the writer in (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 332, 339, that the
dividends paid credit might in this instance be considered to be independent of the tax-
ability of the distribution, in the same manner that distributions in liquidation charge-
able to earnings or profits confer a credit under § 27(f), although not taxable as a
dividend to the stockholder under § 115(c). The author of this note adds, however, that
in view of the avowed purpose of the Act to increase taxable income in the hands
of shareholders, § 27(h) should be considered as covering all cases but those specifically
excepted.
*'Dividends in treasury shares had been held non-taxable, prior to the 1936 Act, by
both the Board and the Bureau. See James Kay, 28 B T. A. 331 (1933); IT 2449,
CB VIII-1, p. 101.
'Gain or loss may be realized upon the sale of treasury stock; see Reg. 94, Art.
22(a)-16.
='247 U. S. 347 (1918) ; see (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 1321, 1328.
'MONTGOMERY, AUDITING THEORY AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 1927) pp. 244-247; KESTER,
ACCOUNTnNG THEORY AND PRAcTIcE (3rd ed. 1925) vol. II, pp. 181, 409-410.
'In Borg et at v. International Silver Co., 11 F. (2d) 147, 150 (C. C. A. 2d 1925).
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But it would seem that by distribution to stockholders as a dividend treasury
shares lose this potentiality which gave them their character as an asset. In
the hands of distributees treasury stock does not change relative equities, nor
does it constitute a different kind of property from what was held before.
While it may be arguable that there has been a severance from the corporate
assets, it has been pointed out that the courts are interpreting the severance
requirement as necessitating merely a distribution of a different kind of
property from that on which the dividend was declared.
II
PREFERENCE PROBLEMS IN THEIR RELATION TO ELECTIVE DISTRIBUTIONS
The 1936 Act has added to the perplexity of one who would determine how
,certain types of corporate distributions should be treated by both corpora-
tion and stockholder. The corporation is, of course, interested in obtaining
a dividends paid credit. Section 115 (f) (2) will provide food for thought
for many a corporate executive. This section provides that a certain type of
distribution, which may for convenience be called an optional dividend,3 9
shall be considered to be taxable, the effect from the corporation's standpoint
being that the distribution will furnish the basis for a dividends paid credit.
Doubts are bound to arise as to the availability of any credit at all, because
of the provisions of Section 27 (g) which reads as follows:
"No dividends paid credit shall be allowed with respect to any dis-
tribution unless the distribution is pro rata, equal in amount, and with no
preference to any share of stock as compared with other shares of the
same class."
In most instances of dividends paid or payable in more than one medium it
will be impossible, as well as undesirable, to arrange that each distributee
receive the exact same cash value per share. Is Section 27 (g) to be inter-
preted literally, and if not, where is the line to be drawn ?4
Before engaging in a more detailed discussion of this question, it is neces-
sary to note that Section 115 (f) (2) may be to some extent limited by Section
115 (f) (1).4 1 There are numerous cases42 passing upon the taxability of
dividends paid or payable partly in stock and partly in cash, 43 but their full
relevance to the present problems is doubtful. It must be repeated that
'In some cases this term may not be precisely accurate, but it is sufficiently descriptive
,of these dividends to serve for purposes of this discussion.
"For a discussion in another connection of drawing lines in tax cases, see PAUL,
STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (1937) pp. 100-104.
"All parts of a statute are to be read together. Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U. S. 233(1928) ; U. S. v. Troy, 293 U. S. 58 (1934); Helvering v. Morgan's Inc., 293 U. S.
121 (1934).
'See PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) 8.74-8.83
and cases therein cited.
'The cases which discuss "form" and "substance" in connection with stock dividends
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from 1921 through 1935 the courts had only to decide whether a given dis-
tribution, in the hands of a given distributee, was "in substance" a stock
dividend, and if a stock dividend, whether it was of a type exempted from
taxation by the Revenue Act. This is primarily a question of statutory con-
struction. Since the 1936 Act the courts must decide whether a given dis-
tribution is a stock dividend which may be taxed. This is a question of
constitutional power to tax.
The most important cases wherein the dividend was held non-taxable
have involved an agreement in advance by a controlling majority with the
corporation,44 that they would take stock irrespective of what the minority
would receive.4 5 The theory is that the stockholder receiving stock never had
a legal claim against the corporation for anything but stock.46 The require-
ment that a distributee must have no possible claim against the corporation
for cash,47 in order to render the dividend non-taxable to him, is a good
working rule and one to which the courts and the Board have turned more and
more as a way out of difficulty.
are, as might be expected, in considerable confusion, and it is impossible to formulate
any satisfactory rule. For example, the same distribution has been held a stock dividend
in one court as to one shareholder, and a cash dividend in another tribunal as to a dif-
ferent shareholder. See Deitz v. U. S., 6 F. Supp. 944 (D.C.S.D. W. Va. 1933), and
Margaret B. Payne, 19 B.T.A. 1305 (1930).
See opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Com'r v. Sansome, 60 F. (2d) 931 (C. C. A.
2d 1932), cert. denied 287 U. S. 667 (1932), in which he speaks of "such vague al-
ternatives as 'form' and 'substance,' anodynes for the pains of reasoning."
The cases cited suggest the not inconceivable situation under the 1936 Act in which
one court will hold a distribution taxable to stockholders and another court will deny the
corporation a credit for the same distribution because not taxable to stockholders.
This kind of conflict could, of course, favor taxpayers as well as the Treasury; it
would be perfectly possible for the corporation to obtain a credit and for the stock-
holders to remain untaxed.
"Where some or all stockholders merely agree inter sese to take stock, and the
corporate resolution calls for payment in cash, the dividend has been held not to be
a stock dividend. The corporation had created an account payable which it was legally
bound to satisfy in cash or its equivalent. See W. J. Hunt, 5 B. T. A. 356 (1926)
Eugene E. Paul, 2 B. T. A. 150 (1925).
'U. S. v. Mellon, 281 Fed. 645 (C. C. A. 3d 1922) ; U. S. v. Davison, 9 F. (2d) 1022
(C. C. A. 3d 1926); Jackson v. Com'r, 51 F. (2d) 650 (C. C. A. 3d 1931); Irving
v. U. S., 44 F. (2d) 246 (Ct. Cl. 1930); W. Q. Wright, 10 B. T. A. 806 (1928)
George T. Smith, 21 B. T. A. 782 (1930).
"Considerable weight is attached in these cases to the fact that the corporation's cash
position did not warrant distribution of cash to all stockholders. While this circum-
stance is a factor to be considered in border-line cases, it never seems to have been con-
trolling. If the corporation has sufficient surplus it may properly borrow to make
payment. See Eugene E. Paul, 2 B. T. A. 150 (1925) ; see also FLETCnIER, CYCLOPEDIA
CORPORATIONS (1932) Vol. 11, § 5342.
"
7There may, of course, be situations involving constructive receipt, as where
dividends are applied to the payment of an uncalled portion of the subscription price.
Unless the resolution does not provide explicitly that the dividend is to be so used, or
unless stockholders have given notes for the balance due which are cancelled upon
declaration of the dividend, the dividend has usually been held non-taxable. Teehan
v. U. S., 25 F. (2d) 884 (D. C. D. Mass. 1928) ; Michaels v. McLaughlin, 20 F. (2d)
959 (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1927); J. F. Carlston, 22 B. T. A. 217 (1931); J. E. Brading, 17
B. T. A. 436 (1929); Charles Watson Hull, 13 B. T. A. 299 (1928); W. Q. Wright,
i0 B. T. A. 806 (1928); IT 2455, CB VIII-1, p. 218; see PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW
Op FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION (1934) §§ 8.80, 8.81.
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It may be argued that the type of distribution involving a prior agreement
by large interests to take stock does not fall within Section 115 (f) (2) be-
cause, as to the majority shareholders, there is no real election. This is
doubtless true,48 but leaves in the air the situation with respect to the amounts
paid to minority stockholders. Unquestionably, the distribution is taxable
in their hands, either because they received cash, or because they could elect
to do so. But if .they receive cash, a credit may be disallowed under Section
27 (g) because of a difference between the amount of cash per share and
the value of stock per share distributed.
Distributions conferring a real option have more frequently been held
taxable to all recipients. This is certainly true in the case of a cash dividend
declaration49 accompanied by a provision that stockholders may elect to take
stock.50 Even if all distributees elect to take stock, the form of the resolution
gives rise to a debtor-creditor relationship between corporation and stock-
holders, 51 with the result that the stock is distributed in satisfaction of an
account payable and therefore constitutes taxable income.
5 2
Where the dividend is declared payable in stock with an option to the
stockholder to take cash, no such debtor-creditor relationship arises until
the stockholder notifies the corporation of his election to receive cash. Accord-
ingly, the Treasury has previously ruled that those who take stock are in
receipt of a non-taxable dividend,53 since there is merely a transfer of surplus
to capital account. However, the Commissioner's regulations now provide"4
that an optional dividend is taxable irrespective of the form of the resolution.
Inasmuch as the question has now become one of constitutional power, this
ruling may well be valid if some stockholders take cash and some take stock.
'
5The Treasury interpretation, Reg. 94, Art. 115-8, includes within Sec. 115(f) all
optional distributions "whether the election is exercised or exercisable before or after
the declaration of the distribution." However, where it appears that no cash dividend
at all would have been declared without a prior agreement by large stockholders to
take stock, such stockholders cannot properly be said to have had any option.
"'See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 215 (1920) : "It is said that there is no
difference in principle between a simple stock dividend and a case where stockholders
use money received as cash dividends to purchase additional stock contemporaneously
issued by the corporation. But an actual cash dividend, with a real option to the stock-
holder either to keep the money for his own or to reinvest it in new shares, would be
as far removed as possible from a true stock dividend, such as the one we have under
consideration . . ."
C'L. Elmer Wood, 29 B. T. A. 735 (1934) ; Joseph Paper, 29 B. T. A. 523 (1933);
TD 3052, CB-3, p. 38.
aU. S. v. Guinzburg, 278 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 2d 1921).
'Bacon-McMillan Veneer Co., 20 B.T.A. 556 (1930); Callanan Road Improve-
ment Co., 12 B. T. A. 1109 (1928).
'GCM 6709, CB VIII-2, p. 132. See also IT 2538, CB IX-1, p. 144, wherein a cash
dividend was declared payable in stock to those who had previously notified the corpora-
tion of their election to take it. It was ruled that the shares distributed were not taxable,
since the rights of shareholders to receive stock had become fixed prior to the declaration
of the dividend. The debt of the corporation was reduced pro tanto.
"'Reg. 94, Art. 115-8; "... the entire distribution is a taxable dividend regardless
Of-. ..(3) whether the declaration of the dividend provides that payment will be made
in one medium unless the shareholder specifically requests payment in the other."
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In this situation proportionate equities will have been substantially changed.
But where all take stock and the dividend resolution does not create a debtor-
creditor relationship, it would still seem that the distribution is not constitu-
tionally subject to tax in the hands of its recipients.
The application of Section 27 (g) in the case of an optional dividend paid
to some stockholders in one medium and to other stockholders in another
medium puts corporate taxpayers in a quandary.55 The Commissioner has
interpreted this section very strictly, as follows:
"Before a corporation may be entitled to any dividends paid-credit with
respect to a distribution, regardless of the medium in which the distribu-
tion is made, every shareholder of the class of stock with respect to which
the distribution is made must be treated the same as every other share-
holder of that class. The limitation imposed by the Act is unqualified
and the existence of a preference is sufficient to prohibit allowance of
the dividends paid credit regardless of the fact (1) that such preference
is authorized by all the shareholders of the corporation, or (2) that the
part of the distribution received by the shareholder benefited by the pref-
erence is taxable to him as a dividend. A corporation will not be entitled
to a dividends paid credit with respect to any distribution upon a class
of stock if there is distributed to any shareholder of such class (in pro-
portion to the number 'of shares held by him) more or less than his pro
rata part of the distribution as compared with the distribution made to any
other shareholder of the same class. The disallowance of the dividends
paid credit, where any preference or inequality in fact exists, extends
to the entire amount of the distribution and not merely to a part of such
distribution."
The examples given do little to illuminate the present problem. Indeed,
it is difficult to discover the real purpose underlying this section. The purpose
of the undistributed profits surtax is to subject profits to higher surtaxes,
either in the hands of large stockholders who would not otherwise have with-
drawn earnings from the corporate business, or in the hands of the corpora-
tion itself.56 The aggregate effect of Sections 27 (e) and (h) and Section
115 (f) is that a distribution taxable to stockholders is not taxed to the cor-
poration, and vice versa. Inasmuch as it is impossible that any "earnings or
profits" will escape both corporate and individual surtaxes, Section 27 (g)
seems to be surplusage. It is well settled that preferential distributions may
constitute dividends taxable to the recipients, 57 and in cases where they are
so taxable Section 27 (g) imposes, in effect, a double surtax by allowing the
'Reg. 94, Art. 27(g)-1.
'See the President's Message to Congress: "The accumulation of surplus in corpora-
tions controlled by taxpayers with large incomes is encouraged by the present freedom
of undistributed corporate income from surtaxes. Since stockholders are the beneficial
owners of both distributed and undistributed corporate income, the aim, as a matter of
fundamental equity, should be to seek equality of tax burden on all corporate income
whether distributed or withheld from the beneficial owners." H. REP. No. 2475, to accom-
pany H. REP. 12395, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 2; SEN. REP. No. 2156, to accompany H.
REP. 12395, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 2.
'PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) § 8.12
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corporation no credit. Of course, this provision will prevent the spreading
of dividend payments among shareholders in the lower brackets.58 That is,
a large shareholder will not be able to have his share of corporate earnings
retained in the business untaxed to him while the corporation at the same
time materially reduces its surtax liability by cash distributions to numerous
small stockholders. But the sweeping interpretation promulgated by the
Treasury seems unwarranted in its possible application to optional distribu-
tions.
Corporations will naturally attempt to avail themselves of optional dis-
tributions as a means of securing a credit while retaining earnings in the
business.5 9 To accomplish this purpose they will be inclined to make their
offer of stock as attractive as possible. Of course, if there is too great a dif-
ferential between the stock and cash offers, stockholders will have no real
option,60 and the distribution may be held to be a non-taxable stock dividend.
Where the stockholder might reasonably elect one medium or the other, he
will be taxed under Section 115 (f) and, by the literal wording of Section 27
(g), the corporation will secure no credit. Double taxation is the result.
The same may well be true even where the directors make an honest effort
to arrange exact equality between cash and stock. For purposes of the
dividends paid credit valuation of stock is to be "at the time of the payment". 61
If there is a fluctuation in the value of the stock between the date of declara-
tion and the date of payment, as there may well be these days, there will no
longer be exact equality. Furthermore, since directors' criteria of value are
likely to differ from the Treasury's method of computation, 62 there is no,
guarantee that the Commissioner will regard the valuation contemplated in the
corporate resolution as conclusive. 63
o'See PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) § 32A.30.
wIn addition to the use of taxable stock dividends and optional dividends, there are
tax minimizing possibilities in the use of part-paid shares, calling payments thereon
coincidentally with the declaration of cash dividends. See J. E. Brading, 17 B. T. A.
436 (1929) ; Charles Watson Hull, 13 B. T. A. 299 (1928); Luthe Hardware Co., 6
B. T. A. 53 (1927) ; Theresa Zellerbach, 2 B. T. A. 1076 (1925). See also Graham,
The Undistributed Profits Tax and the Investor, (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 6, 8. This.
method will not, however, be effective unless stockholders are given a real opportunity
to get cash if they so desire. J. F. Carlston, 22 B. T. A. 217 (1931); W. Q. Wright,
10 B.T.A. 806 (1928).
'See PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) § 32A.34,
(Supp.) wherein it is pointed out that "the term 'election' certainly implies a real choice
between genuine alternatives".
'Sec. 27(e).
"'To the possible suggestion that both directors and the Commissioner use market
quotations alone, the answer is that market quotations are a fallible index of true
value when considered to the exclusion of other factors. See PAUL AND ZIMET, Realistic
Valuation for Federal Tax Purposes, included in STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (1937).
If corporations resort to an increased use of taxable stock distributions, stockholders
may frequently have to sell their stock to pay the tax. The consequent lowering of
market quotations, especially where no ready market exists, might cause the corporatiorr
to secure an unduly small credit, if market prices are to be the sole guide to value.
631t should be borne in mind that for the purposes of the dividends paid credit the
value of a "taxable stock dividend" is "the fair market value of the stock or the stock
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Some of the results indicated can hardly have been intended by Congress
and certainly they are undesirable. The statute, as it stands, puts corporate
directors in an unfortunate dilemma. The ultimate cure is an amendment of
the statute. Short of statutory amendment, it would be desirable for the
Treasury Department to take the courageous position of liberally interpreting 4
Section 27 (g) by ruling that equality of opportunity is sufficient compliance
with Section 27 (g), and that the Section does not require mathematical
-equality of distribution. Such a construction does no violence to the two-fold
lfgislative intent of forcing corporate distributions or taxing in the corpora-
tion where no distribution is made, and would serve the purpose of saving
from double taxation where none appears to have been intended. The legis-
lative purpose would also be saved of preventing a credit where cash dis-
tributions are made to small stockholders and are withheld from larger
interests 65 which are taxable at higher brackets.
right at the time of the payment" (§ 27(e) ), whereas the value of a distribution
of treasury stock is "the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the corporation
at the time of the payment, or the fair market value of thq property at the time of the
payment, whichever is the lower" (§ 27(c) ).
'Signs are not lacking that the Commissioner is willing to be reasonable. See Mim.
4514, CB XV-2, p. 90. The corporation had issued a 1% preferred stock dividend to
holders of common stock (other preferred stock being already outstanding).' Holders
of very small numbers of common shares received cash. Holders of less than 100
common shares received scrip certificates conferring none of the privileges of a share-
holder, and which would become void unless exchanged for a full preferred share within
a reasonable time. Holders of 100 common shares received a whole share of preferred
stock instead of 100 scrip certificates. It was ruled that this distribution was not so
preferential as to make Art. 27 (g)-1 apply.
See also IT 3037, CB XVI-1, p. 2. "In any case in which the taxability of the
distribution is debatable ... the general policy will be to allow a tentative credit."
'Or where the latter receive a special non-taxable" stock dividend.
